Masako K. Hiraga

The Interplay of Metaphor and Iconicity:
A Cognitive Approach to Poetic Texts

Abstract

This essay attempts to clarify the interrelationship between the notions of metaphor and iconicity in the theory of cognitive metaphor, particularly in the model of 'blending' (Turner and Fauconnier 1995, in press, Fauconnier and Turner 1996, Turner 1996, 1998, among others). In cognitive and semiotic terms, 'icons' and 'metaphors' share that property of signification 'motivated' by similarity. Connecting things of similarity is one of the basic operations of the human mind. The treatment of metaphor and iconicity in an interrelated fashion will provide a more cohesive and integrated explanation of various linguistic phenomena. The list of such phenomena includes word formation, word order, grammaticalisation, semantic change, poetic discourse, signed languages and writing systems, as manifestations of the interplay between metaphor and iconicity. This study shows that poetic texts, in particular, serve as an optimal example in this exploration because in poetic discourse, the interplay of metaphor and iconicity is foregrounded rather than backgrounded as in everyday discourse (Jakobson and Waugh 1979).

This paper, therefore, aims to contribute in the following two issues. Firstly, theoretical clarification of the interplay of metaphor and iconicity will be given in cognitive terms. Particularly, with the model of blending, we can specify which part(s) of the

---

1 This is a revised and enlarged version of my paper entitled as "Metaphor-Icon Link in Poetic Text: A Cognitive Approach to Iconicity", appeared in the Journal of the University of the Air, No. 16, 1996, pp. 147-173. Previous versions of parts of this paper were also presented at various meetings, most notably at the 5th Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies held at University of California, Berkeley, in June 1994 (co-authored with Joanna Radwanska-Williams), and at the Annual Conference of Poetics and Linguistics Association held at Queen's University, Belfast, in April 1996. I would like to express my hearty gratitude to Hayley Davis, Don Freeman, Margaret Freeman, Joseph Coquen, Joanna Radwanska-Williams, Joan Turner, Mark Turner, and Valerie Wilkinson for their invaluable comments at various stages of this project.
metaphorical process – whether the input, generic, or blended spaces – relate(s) to the iconic mapping of form and meaning. Secondly, the analysis will demonstrate how the interplay of metaphor and iconicity is manifested in linguistic signs in general, and in poetic texts in particular. It will be claimed that there are two major types of manifestation: (i) that there are iconic moments in metaphor; and (ii) that a form acquires an iconic meaning via metaphor.

1. Introduction

Over the past decade, there has been a growing interest in metaphor and iconicity in the fields of cognitive and functional linguistics. Those linguists who have begun to look at metaphor and iconicity share the basic assumption that the nature of language structure and use is not entirely arbitrary but motivated in many cases by the general cognitive processes of analogical reasoning. The American philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce, influenced the pioneers in the mid-20th century linguistics, such as Jakobson (1971 [1966]) and Bolinger (1977), in their explorations of iconicity in linguistic signs. Although Peirce treated iconicity as an embracing metaphor in his famous doctrine of the sign, this close link of iconicity and metaphor has not fully been elaborated in the literature. Even those current linguistic studies that have incorporated iconicity in the scope of their analysis have either discarded issues of metaphor from their studies (Hajian 1985a, 1985b, Waugh 1992, 1994, among others) or treated iconicity as a subordinate issue to metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff and Turner 1989).

By contrast, this study attempts to clarify the interrelationship of metaphor and iconicity in the context of a cognitive theory of metaphor. The particular cognitive framework that we will use is the model of ‘blending’ proposed by Turner and Fauconnier (Turner 1996, 1998, Turner and Fauconnier 1995, in press), which provides a more elaborated and sophisticated account of the mechanism of creativity in metaphor than the Lakoff-Johnson model (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). By introducing four items (two input spaces: a source and a target), a generic space (which preserves abstract shared properties of both inputs), and a blended space (in which new meanings are emergent), the model of blending can specify which part(s) of the metaphorical process relate(s) to the interplay of form and meaning in the text, and thereby can clarify the complexity of systematic creation and interpretation of ambiguity with reference to the ways visual and auditory representation contribute in this process of meaning creation.

In cognitive and semiotic terms, icons and metaphors share a common property of signification, namely, that ‘motivated’ by similarity. Whether the items to be connected are concrete objects, formal structures, relational properties or abstract concepts, connecting things of similarity is one of the basic operations of the human mind. Iconicity deals with a mapping between form (structure) and meaning in various degrees of abstractness, from concrete attributive similarities between objects to abstract relational analogies between structures of form and meaning. On the other hand, metaphor is a mapping between two conceptual domains of meaning, a projection of a schematised pattern (system) from a less abstract source domain onto a more abstract target domain. The clarification of a metaphor-icon link will strengthen the cognitive approach so as to provide a more cohesive and integrated explanation of various linguistic phenomena, including word formation, word order, grammaticalisation, semantic change, poetic discourse, signed languages and writing systems, as manifestations of the metaphor-icon link. I believe, in particular, that poetic texts, like signed languages (Taub 1997) and logographic writing systems, are particularly suited for this exploration because in poetic discourse a metaphor-icon link is foregrounded rather than backgrounded as in ordinary spoken discourse (Jakobson and Waugh 1979).

This paper, therefore, contributes to the following two issues: (1) theoretical clarification – defining the interrelationship of metaphor and iconicity in the model of cognitive metaphor. In particular, the model of ‘blending’ proposed by Turner and Fauconnier offers an effective tool to analyse how iconicity relates to various parts of the metaphorical process; (2) demonstration – examining how a metaphor-icon link is manifested in the illustrative examples of poetic discourse.

---

1 For the working definition of ‘metaphor’ and ‘icon’ to be employed in this paper, see Sections 2 and 3.

2 Peirce divides iconic signs into three subtypes, images, diagrams, and metaphors, and gives the following definition: “Those which partake of simple qualities, or First Finessness, are images; those which represent the relations, mainly dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts of one thing by analogous relations in their own parts, are diagrams; those which represent the representative character of a representamen by representing a parallelism in something else, are metaphors (false in the original)” (1955[1902]: 105). The in-text reference with different years of publication indicates that the year in brackets is a source or an original work and the year in parenthesis is an added volume according to which the citation is made.

3 Danesi (1995) and Taub (1997) are exceptions. The former deals with the image content of metaphor as iconicity and reports a psycholinguistic experimental study. The latter is a detailed survey of an icon metaphor link in American Sign Language.

4 ‘Blending’ actually covers a wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic phenomena including “conceptual metaphor, metonymy, counterfactuals, conceptual change” (Turner and Fauconnier 1993).

---

183). “classification, the making of hypotheses, inference, and the origin and combining of grammatical constructions”, (ibid., 186) “idioms, .... jokes, advertising, and other aspects of linguistic and nonlinguistic behavior” (loc. cit.).
2. A Glimpse of the Issue

2.1. Metaphor in Icon

It is only recently that the word ‘icon’ has become readily understood as a loan word in Japanese. This is because of the persuasiveness of computer culture. When you actually manipulate the ‘folders’, ‘documents’ and ‘wastebasket’ on the ‘desktop’ of your computer screen, you can see the shape of the folders and open, move, close or even discard them into the wastebasket as you wish. You can understand what the icons stand for even without instructions because the folders and documents on the screen resemble the objects that you already know in your office. The folder on the screen is an icon for a folder, the document for a document, the wastebasket for a wastebasket, the desktop (the term actually refers to the screen itself) for the surface of a desk. Icons resemble the objects they stand for in terms of their shape, form, appearance or structure. Icons are easy to understand because their resemblance to the objects is immediate and concrete.

A moment’s reflection, however, makes us realise that the folder, document, wastebasket and desktop are very different from the objects that we actually have in our office. Folders in our office do not include other folders in them while folders on the screen can, in theory, contain an unlimited number of other folders. In our office, we do not usually put a wastebasket on the top of our desk, but the desktop of the computer screen has a wastebasket on the same surface as the file-folders.

The use of the words, folder and desktop, to signify these icons is metaphorical in a technical sense, because we are making connections between different things based on the certain similarities. The folders represented by icons on the screen as well as the folder objects in our office are containers of information used for the purpose of storage and classification. The desktop is a place where we work both on the screen and in the office. When we call the rectangular signs on the screen folders and documents, the names for the icons are a metaphorical extension of the original items which signify the referents (i.e., the folder object and the document object). Names such as folder, document and desktop, with their extended metaphorical meaning, cue the interpretation of the iconic signs. If we call these iconic signs by different names, say, ‘box’ or ‘rectangle’, it would be difficult to draw the connection, because the metaphorical extension is less obvious. In short, a metaphor reinforces or navigates the iconic meaning of the sign.

The folders, documents and wastebasket on the computer screen can be described as both icons and metaphors at the same time. They are icons because they look similar to the objects they represent. They are metaphors because, through metaphorical extension of the names given, certain properties of the concept of folder, document and wastebasket are cognitively mapped onto the signs on the screen, or onto the mathematical computation represented by those signs. Because of the visual resemblance of the folder and wastebasket icons with actual folders and wastebaskets, we notice their iconicity more readily than their metaphorical status. In other words, while iconicity is more dominant than metaphor in the computer screen example, both iconicity and metaphor are at work in the signification of highly iconic signs.

1.2. Iconicity in Metaphor

Metaphor and iconicity occur together at the level of metaphorical signification, too. When computer jargon became popular, we began to use it in talking about something else. For example, when we say, “I have too many files open in my mind, and my mind is jammed”, we are referring to our mind as if it were a computer. Here, we are not only using expressions from computer vocabulary, but we are also conceptualising our mind as if it were a computer. So, we also say,

- My system crashed.
- He has a read-only memory.
- You gave me a lot of input.
- I have too much on my desktop.
- She’s in emulation mode.

---

5 In this essay, the term ‘icon’ is used in a narrower semiotic sense as defined above than is usually employed in computer jargon in which it may refer to any visual symbols.
6 The computer examples mainly concern Macintosh screen display.
7 Incidentally, the wastebasket on the Macintosh screen is used not only for dumping the documents or applications, but it is also used for ejecting the floppy disks or compact disks from the drive. The latter function contradicts our conceptualisation of a wastebasket to the extent that the computer users often find it difficult or unnatural to follow this ejecting procedure of the disk.
8 Metaphorical expressions are illustrated in italics, and metaphorical concepts in uppercase letters.
9 This does not imply that there is not also the reverse process of conceptualisation, i.e., understanding computers in terms of the human mind – COMPUTER IS A MIND. We say, for example, “This computer has a large memory”, “His computer has a mind of its own”, and “My computer is stubborn.”
Metaphor allows us to understand a relatively abstract and unstructured subject matter (technically called a target domain) in terms of a more concrete and structured subject matter (a source domain). In our example, we use the terms designating computer processes as tools to represent the workings of our own minds. We know how to install, save and delete information in the computer because these are the terms that describe our practical experience with the computer. Therefore, it is natural to apply the pattern knowledge gained from the experience of using a computer to the invisible, complex functioning of our own brain. This is the experiential basis for metaphorical conceptualisation.

The same process that made computer icons of the files, desktops, and wastebaskets of the conventional office makes those same icons useful for conceptualising the functioning of the brain; we use items which are cognitively accessible as the source for metaphors. Metaphors may be imaged from visual, auditory, and other sensory experience. When we say, "I have too many files open in my mind", it is easy to evoke the image of a screen with many files open. And the image evoked in our mind is similar to the actual computer screen with many files open. In this way, we can say that the image content of metaphor, particularly of a source domain, is an iconic moment involved in metaphor. In Danesi’s words (1995: 266), "the particular content of a metaphor can be said to constitute an interpretation of reality in terms of mental icons that literally allows us to see what is being talked about (italics in the original)".

Not only the image content but also the correspondence of the two items mediated by metaphor signal an iconic moment. As mentioned earlier, metaphor is a mapping from a source to a target. Each mapping consists of a fixed set of correspondences between entities in the two domains. In our example, some of the characteristics of computers are mapped onto what we know about the human mind. For example, files correspond with the storage of ideas, crash with no functioning, read-only memory with a lack of learnability, input with information, and emulation mode with imitating.

Technically speaking, this mapping is a projection of image-schemas from the source domain onto the target domain. Image-schemas are skeletal patterns or structures that recur in our sensory and motor experiences, perceptual interactions, and cognitive operations (cf. Johnson 1987). For example, when we say, "I have too many files open in my mind", the image-schema of excess in the source ("too many opened files") and in the target ("too many ideas") are aligned. Note that there is an iconic moment in this alignment of image-schemas. The image of too many files corresponds to the image of too many ideas diagrammatically. In other words, they resemble each other in terms of the image-schemas of excess. There is a structural analogy between the two image-schemas.

While iconicity was more dominant in the computer screen example, metaphor is more dominant than iconicity in the signification process of MIND IS A COMPUTER, because the projection of the COMPUTER domain onto the HUMAN MIND domain is more conceptual than perceptual (visual, auditory or sensory). Nonetheless, the experiential motor-sensory image base and schematic parallel structure are iconic moments in the metaphorical signification (for further technical elaboration, see next section).

In what follows, I would like to demonstrate that in linguistic signs (Section 3), and particularly in poetic texts (Section 4), a close link between metaphor and icon is manifest in the two ways outlined above: (1) that there are iconic (both imagic and diagrammatic) moments in metaphor; and (2) that a form (structure) acquires an iconic (particularly diagrammatic) meaning via metaphor. I would also like to show that the model of "blending" proposed by Turner and Fauconnier (Turner 1996, 1998, Turner and Fauconnier 1995, 1999) provides an effective instrument to clarify the complexity of the metaphor-icon link.

3. Theoretical Implications of Metaphor-Icon Link

3.1. Iconicity and Metaphor Defined

In cognitive terms, iconicity (i.e., images and diagrams in Peircean terminology) deals with a mapping between form (structure) and meaning (cf Lakoff and Turner 1989) in various degrees of abstraction, from concrete attributive resemblance to abstract relational analogy. Metaphor, on the other hand, is a mapping between two conceptual spaces of meaning, a projection of a schematised pattern (system) from a less abstract source space onto a more abstract target space (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987, 1993, Turner 1996).

It is often the case that the basis of similarity in the icons is derived from visual, auditory and other formal traits of the object that they stand for, and that the iconic signs are often the visual, auditory or formal representations themselves. Metaphors, on the other hand, do not necessarily have such traits. Rather, they manifest themselves as a heuristic device to mediate dissimilar concepts by means of the similarity they yield. As Anderson (1984: 459) correctly points out, "a metaphor, like an image or an analogy, is what it represents - not because of an antecedent identity or similarity, not as a reminiscence, but in virtue of a similarity which it creates". Indeed, in icons, the similarity relationship between the sign and the object is taken to be pre-existent. For example, we assume that there is a similarity between the folder icon and the folder object even if we

---

The term 'imagic' is used to refer to Peircean notion of 'image' as a subtype of iconicity (For the definition of Peircean notion of 'image', see Footnote 2).
have no prior experience with the computers. In contrast, a metaphor connects two entities, say a mind and a computer, which are a priori dissimilar. The connecting act via a metaphor establishes the similarity between the two dissimilar entities, and thus creates a new meaning or interpretation.

3.2. Iconic Moments in Metaphor

Although cognitive linguistics offers a clearer definition for metaphor and iconicity, it is not satisfactory that they treat metaphor and iconicity as somewhat isolated manifestations from each other. Because metaphor and iconicity are similar cognitive operations motivated by analogical reasoning, they would be best captured in their interplay rather than isolation as Peirce correctly suggested but failed to develop.

It will be claimed that the model of blending developed by Turner and Fauconnier (Turner 1996, 1998, Turner and Fauconnier 1995, in press, among others) offers a promising theoretical basis and an effective methodological contribution to explicating the interrelationship of metaphor and iconicity (i.e., Peircean ‘image’ and ‘diagram’) and analysing their actual manifestations in language. Turner and Fauconnier (1995: 184) propose a model of ‘conceptual projection across four or more (many) mental spaces rather than two domains’, to explain a wide range of phenomena including “conceptual metaphor, metonymy, counterfactuals, conceptual change” (ibid., 183), “classification, the making of hypotheses, inference, and the origin and combining of grammatical constructions”, (ibid., 186) “idioms, jokes, advertising, and other aspects of linguistic and nonlinguistic behaviour” (loc. cit.).

The basic claims of the cognitive account of metaphor, developed by Lakoff, Johnson and Turner (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987, Lakoff and Turner 1989, Lakoff 1993), and elaborated as a more general model of ‘blending’ by Turner and Fauconnier can be summarised as follows (see Figure 1):

1) Metaphor is a cognitive process in which one set of concepts (a target) is understood in terms of another (a source). According to the model of blending metaphor is a conceptual integration of four mental spaces11. Mental spaces are small conceptual arrays constructed for local purposes of understanding. When a conceptual projection occurs, two input mental spaces (source and target in a metaphor) are created. These input spaces have relevant information from the respective domains, as well as additional structure from culture, context, point of view and other background information.

![Figure 1. The Model of Blending](http://www.wam.umd.edu/~mturn/ W W W/blending.html)

2) There are two kinds of middle mental space in addition to the input spaces. These middle spaces are: (i) a generic space that applies to both input spaces; and (ii) a blended space that is a rich space integrating the generic structure, structures from each input space and background information. Often the blended space has an emergent structure of its own.

3) Each mental space has an image-schematic structure that is consistent and preserved through conceptual projection of generic and input spaces. The image-schemas are skeletal patterns in our sensory and motor experience, such as a container, a motion along a path, part and whole, centre and periphery, symmetry and so forth.

4) The blended space develops inferences, arguments, ideas and emotions, which can modify the initial input spaces and change our views of the knowledge used to build those input spaces (cf. Turner 1996: 83).

Let us take the example, “I have too many files open in my mind”, and recapitulate the main points about iconic moments in metaphor according to the model of blending. As we have seen, the conceptual metaphor, MIND IS A

11 Turner and Fauconnier use the term ‘mental space’ in contrast to the term ‘conceptual domain’ employed by Lakoff, Johnson, and other cognitivists. Mental spaces are small conceptual arrays put together for local purposes of action and understanding, while conceptual domain is a large structural array that could not be made active in thinking (cf. Turner 1996).
COMPUTER, allows us to understand an abstract entity, a human mind, in terms of a concrete entity, a computer. The cross-space mapping between the inputs constitutes the content of the generic space. In our example, the image-schemas of objects resembling files, an excessive amount of them, a machine and its movement in the source input ("too many opened files") are aligned with the image-schemas of abstract objects and manipulation of the mass of these objects in the target input ("too many ideas") by the generic space which has the highly abstract, skeletal image-schematic structure taken to apply to both the input spaces (e.g., a frame of an excess of objects).

Notice that there are iconic moments in this alignment of image-schemas. The choice of the term, 'image-schema', itself suggests that both 'image' and 'diagram' are to be related to this cross-space mapping of metaphor. In the input spaces, from a vast amount of information provided by our bodily experiences, interactive perception, contextual and background knowledge, we have an array of images that do not clash with the entire cognitive process of metaphor. In our example, the image content includes visual (or interactive) images of an action of opening many files, a screen showing many files open, a dialogue box saying 'too many files open', and/or a screen frozen due to too many files open. These are mimetic mental representations of sensory perceptions, and constitute imagic iconicity. At the same time, a mental space develops a structure by selecting and schematising the images, namely, an image-schematic structure, which has a diagrammatic representation of the image content of mental space (e.g., an image-schema of a blocked action due to an excessive amount of files). A similar process might occur in the target input space to a less concrete degree. For example, the evoked images for 'too many ideas' may be more abstract than what happens in the source, and so is its schematisation. Therefore, there are two types of iconic mappings in the input spaces: an attributive imagic mapping between the sensory perception and the image content, and an analogical diagrammatic mapping between the image content and the schematised images.

Conceptual and image projections do not only occur in input spaces, but they also include a generic space and a blended space. There is a relationship of similarity between the generic space and the input spaces, because the generic space has an imageschematic structure shared with the two inputs. This shared image-schematic structure is skeletal and abstract. In the metaphor, "I have too many files open in my mind", the generic structure can be an image schema of a purposed action or a progress which is blocked with a difficulty. As the image-schematic structure is preserved, the two input spaces are structurally analogous. The analogy supported by the generic space can be described as diagrammatic because it is a structure-preserving schematic correspondence between the source and the generic space, and between the target and the generic space. In other words, diagrammatic iconicity is at work in the analogy between the corresponding image-schematic structures of the generic space and the input spaces.

This metaphor gets its full interpretation and understanding as a conceptual integration in the blended space, in which we have a conceptual mapping of partial structures from both inputs and the generic space, and which develops an emergent structure of its own, for example, disorder, a lack of proper motion, a stoppage, as a result of excessive movements. Figure 2 illustrates imagic and diagrammatic iconic mapping inherent in the conceptual mapping and integration of metaphor.

![Figure 2. Metaphor-Icon Link in the Model of Blending](image-url)

Needless to say, it is metaphor rather than iconicity that prevails in this particular example of "I have too many files open in my mind." For only the very abstract conceptual (theory-building) level seems to involve iconic moments: imagic and diagrammatic iconicity in the evoking of images and the schematisation of images in the input mental spaces, and diagrammatic iconicity...
in the correspondence or counterpart projection of image-schematic structures between the generic space and input spaces.

The discussion above has illustrated that the model of blending lends itself to understanding semantic implications of imagic and diagrammatic iconicity in the cognitive process of metaphor. When we say that metaphor has iconic moments, it means that there are some traces of iconic mapping in general between a fairly abstract form and a concept. No visible figure mirrors the concept in the linguistic representation of this particular example of a conventional metaphor. This does not mean that language structure and use are deprived of iconicity. Until linguistic iconicity is delineated, however, it will not become visible, because it is not foregrounded.

3.3. Iconic Meanings Given to Form by Metaphor

One of the ways by which we can detect iconicity in linguistic resources (such as sounds, words, sentences, discourses and writing systems) comes from conventional metaphors relating to our conception of language. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 126-138) provide a basic insight into how metaphor can give meaning to form. They point out that we conceptualise language by orientational and ontological metaphors, that is, in terms of space and in terms of objects.

A pervasive conceptulisation of language is the CONDUIT metaphor (Reddy 1979) in which ideas are seen as objects, linguistic expressions as containers, and communication as sending and receiving the containers containing ideas as objects. Because we speak and write in a linear order, we also conceptualise language in terms of space in a linear order.

There are a handful of conventional conceptual metaphors which elaborate the ontological and orientational metaphors of language, and which function as a useful tool to give iconic meanings to form. Table 1 gives a non-exhaustive list of examples of such conventional metaphors. For ease of discussion, we will call these conventional metaphors Grammatical Metaphors, because these metaphors, more or less, concern the relationship of form and meaning in grammatical conventions (e.g., phonology, morphology, word formation, and word order).

Because we conceptualise expressions as containers and meanings as contents, we assume that the bigger containers have the larger contents. So, MORE FORM IS MORE MEANING. For example, prolongation, repetition, iteration, and reduplication of linguistic forms such as a sound, a syllable, and a word tend to stand for more of the content. The SAMENESS of FORM stands for the SAMENESS of CONTENT, the DIFFERENCE of FORM, the DIFFERENCE of CONTENT. For example, the use of the same (similar) sound signifies the same (or equivalent) meaning in English morphology, an [s] for the plural, a [non] for the negative prefix and so forth. LOCATION of FORM also gives iconic meanings. In general orientational experiences, we put important things in the centre. For example, there tends to be a building or a monument of importance (a castle, a church or a tower) at the centre of a city, a village or a campus. In English, for instance, when a word is embellished with inflections and affixes, they are peripheral. The stem, which expresses the core meaning, stays in the central position. It is rare that the central shape of a word is altered. Not only the location of the form, but also the sequential order of the form can mirror the space, time and causal sequence of the content. In the standard representation of temporal events, for example, it is more common to state things along the occurrence in time, from past to the present rather than reverse.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metaphor</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quantity of form</td>
<td>Quantity of content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontological</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity or difference of</td>
<td>Material</td>
<td>Identity or difference of content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sequence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symmetry/asymmetry of form</td>
<td>Symmetry/asymmetry of content</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location of form</td>
<td>Near</td>
<td>Strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>Importance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sequence of form</td>
<td>Linear</td>
<td>Sequence of time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Linear</td>
<td>Cause/Effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First/Last</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First/Last</td>
<td>Up/Down, Left/Right, Near/Far</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Halliday (1994) has also noticed the diagrammatic correlation (which he calls 'iconic') between the expressions in the discourse grammar and the contents expressed. According to him, there are three types of such correlation:

1. There is a movement from a given Theme (background) to a thematic New (foreground); this movement in time construes ironically the flow of information.
2. New semiotic entities are created by ... nominal packages, ..., the nominal expression in the grammar construes ironically an objectified entity in the real world.
3. The combination of (1) and (2) construes ironically the total reality, ... a reality consisting of semiotic entities in a periodic flow of information (1994:143).
Halliday's notion of 'packages' and 'movement' is similar to the grammatical metaphors discussed above, namely, LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS and LINEAR SEQUENCE IS CHRONOLOGICAL OR CAUSAL ORDER; but, it goes further to point out that the nominal expressions are the prototypical construal of EXPRESSIONS as PACKAGES.

As a diagram refers to its object by virtue of similarity between the relationship among the parts of the diagram and the relationship among the parts of the object, the structure of linguistic representation resembles the structure of the content that it conveys. As in Caesar's "veni, vidi, vici" (I came, I saw, I conquered) (cf. Jakobson 1965: 350), the syntagmatic order of mention in speech corresponds to the chronological or causal order in which the event occurs. Paradigmatically, word affinity relations such as morphemes (e.g. 'acceptable', 'replaceable' - sharing 'able' in form and 'being capable of doing' in meaning), phonemes (e.g., 'gleam', 'glance', 'glare', 'glitter', etc. - sharing initial /g/ in form and "connection to vision" in meaning) and so forth, suggest that sameness in form signals sameness in meaning; difference in form signals difference in meaning. Diagrammatic icons are, in this sense, analogous to their objects in structure and/or in relation.

Semiotically speaking, these two examples illustrate two broad possibilities in which diagrammatic iconicity is manifested in grammar, and thereby receives interpretation as such by the presence of ontological and orientational metaphors explained above. We will call the two types of iconic form 'structural diagram' and 'relational diagram', which roughly follow Haiman's classification of diagrammatic iconicity into 'motivation' and 'isomorphism' (cf. Haiman 1985a, 1985b). 'Structural diagrams' display a correspondence between structure of form and structure of content, whereas 'relational diagrams' show a tendency to associate sameness in form with sameness in content; difference in form with difference in content. In an extreme case, this tendency is expressed as the principle of "one meaning, one form" (cf. Bolinger 1977). We can see relational diagrams as a special case of structural diagrams, as they presuppose the working of structural analogy. The difference between structural diagrams and relational diagrams seems to be that the former is a structural analogy whereas the latter is a relational analogy. Structural diagrams tend to deal with a correspondence between the structure of linguistic form and the structure of conceptualisation; relational diagrams with a correspondence between the relation in linguistic form and the relation in linguistic meaning. Figure 3 is a graphical presentation of the two principles in question:

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 3. Structural and Relational Diagrams**

Both auditory and visual forms can receive an iconic meaning from the grammatical metaphors, and function as structural or relational diagrams. The relationship of form and meaning in grammatical metaphorical mapping is diagrammatic, because what is preserved is an analogical relationship mediated indirectly by grammatical metaphors. This contrasts with a direct attributive connection such as pure imagic iconicity between the linguistic form and meaning, e.g., a case of onomatopoeia and visual language such as logographs (for more examples and discussion on grammatical metaphors and diagrammatic manifestations, see Jakobson 1970, Bolinger 1977, Haiman 1985a, 1985b, Waugh 1992, 1994, Hira 1994, among others).

To conclude the section, we have discussed that there are two types of metaphor-icon link in language: iconicity in metaphor and metaphor in icon. Iconicity in metaphor concerns the imagic and diagrammatic representation in the creation of meaning in metaphor. This is most prototypically illustrated in the notion of image-schematic structures crucial in the cognitive account for
metaphor. Metaphor in icon also relates to imagic and diagrammatic aspects of the linguistic form. Conventional metaphors which conceptualise our everyday experiences and reality also conceptualise our understanding of language structure and use. These metaphors navigate the way we interpret the forms of linguistic expressions.

The relationships of these two types of metaphor-icon link may be graphically represented by Figure 4:

In the box of 'meaning', the metaphorical process is illustrated according to the model of blending. There are four mental spaces. Imagic and diagrammatic iconicity relate to (1) inside structure of input spaces in which sensory perception is projected onto the image content by imagic mapping, and then onto the image schema by diagrammatic mapping; and (2) the relationship of inputs to the generic spaces in which the diagrammatic mapping projects one space onto another. The box of ‘form’ represents the linguistic resources. When the form mirrors the meaning as in the case of onomatopoeia and visible language (e.g., some toponyms), the imagic mapping occurs in the direction from form to meaning, as illustrated by an arrow. On the other hand, when the grammatical metaphors give meaning to form, there occurs a diagrammatic mapping in the direction from meaning to form illustrated by an arrow. The general structure preserved by this diagrammatic mapping of form and meaning constitutes the generic space in which the grammatical metaphors reside.

The effectiveness of the model of blending shows up here. For it is with this model that we can specify which part(s) of the metaphorical process — whether the input, generic, or blended spaces — relate(s) to the diagrammatic mapping of form and meaning. In theory there are four possibilities: a mapping (1) from generic space onto form; (2) from input source space to form; (3) from input target space to form; and (4) from blended space to form. However, in practice, the case (3) is unlikely because the target space in metaphor, by its own nature, is where the mapping finalises rather than initiates.

### 4. Case Studies of Poetic Texts

I have demonstrated that a framework of cognitive linguistics can provide a tool to analyse the intimate connection between form and meaning that iconicity requires, particularly with reference to an interrelated manifestation of metaphor and iconicity. The rest of this paper develops the idea that poetic texts foreground the link between metaphor and iconicity.

Even though it can be said that the metaphor-icon link is more overt than covert in poetic discourse as opposed to the situation in everyday discourse, there are a variety of degrees and combinations with which metaphor and iconicity manifest themselves. Some texts, though smaller in number, display pure iconicity in which the visual or auditory form itself mirrors the meaning. It is often the case that such poems were composed with the conscious intention of being interpreted that way. Actually, most texts show iconicity more subtly through metaphors. Namely, metaphors are more predominantly produced and apprehended in most texts, and it is such metaphors which navigate the iconic interpretations of the textual structure. The metaphorical reading reinforces certain